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CHARTER LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

I. INTRODUCTION

The intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in Kosovo during the spring of 1999 aroused controversy at
the time and still provokes questions about the legality of the action,
its precedential effect, and procedures for developing new
international law. The participants faced a legal and moral dilemma
between international law prohibitions on the use of force and the
goal of preventing or stopping widespread grave violations of

* Alexander Heard Distinguished Service Professor, Vanderbilt University Law
School; Co-Editor-in-Chief, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. The text of this
manuscript was previously published as an EditorialComment at 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
841 (1999). It is published here with permission of the American Society of
International Law but with the addition of footnote references and support.
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international human rights. This commentary seeks to chart a
course for the future in light of the current legal and moral
environment.
Many individuals on all sides of the Kosovo crisis maintained
the highest standards of law and morality. Regrettably, others,
particularly political leaders, fell short of their moral or legal
obligations or both. Of the latter, the leadership of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) headed by Slobodan Mflofevi6 stands
out. The FRY committed grave international crimes against the
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. However, both the ethnic Albanians
and the Serbs in Kosovo engaged in aggressive and brutal actions
against each other and both were at fault, legally and morally.' The
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has also committed terrorist and
other brutal acts against the Yugoslav Serbs and the FRY forces. As
for the United Nations, though perhaps not morally at fault, it did
not address the Kosovo problem in a timely and effective manner, as
is its responsibility.
Indisputably, the NATO intervention through its bombing
campaign violated the U.N. Charter and international law. As a
result, the intervention risked destabilizing the international rule of
law that prohibits a state or group of states from intervening by the
use of force in another state, absent authorization by the U.N.
Security Council or a situation of self-defense. The NATO actions,
regardless of how well-intentioned, constitute an unfortunate
precedent for states to use force to suppress the commission of
international crimes in other states-grounds that easily can be and
have been abused to justify intervention for less laudable objectives.
As now conceived, the so-called doctrine of humanitarian
intervention can lead to an escalation of international violence,
discord, and disorder and diminish protections of human rights
worldwide. If current international law and organizations are
inadequate to solve problems like the Kosovo situation, better rules
of law and improved organizations might be developed to avoid these
terrible risks and properly protect human rights.
II. U.N. CHARTER LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
Contemporary international law prohibits violations of human
rights and humanitarian law committed by a state against its own
citizens. These duties are owed erga omnes, to all the world. Every
state is obliged to respond to those violations, individually and
collectively, by the use of nonforcible actions and countermeasures.

1.

See generally William W. Hagen, The Balkans' Lethal Nationalisms, 78

FOREIGN AFF. 52 (July-Aug. 1999).
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A variety of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations
may also take part in combating such violations. The NATO actions
in Kosovo, however, raise the question whether international law
permits the use of force by foreign states, individually or collectively,
to stop violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law committed within a single state. The answer turns on U.N.
Charter law and contemporary international law derived from it.

The Security Council was involved in the Kosovo matter for
some time. It adopted three resolutions under Chapter VII of the
Charter prior to the NATO bombing campaign. 2 These resolutions
laid out a plan of action that authorized the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to place an observer
force, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), in Kosovo to monitor
the situation.3 The resolutions also called upon the FRY, the KLA,
and all other states and organizations to stop using force and called
for a halt to violations of human rights. 4 The resolutions did not
authorize the use of force by any outside entity.5 Rather, they
reaffinmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. 6 In
this situation, outside entities had no authority to take forcible
actions. To avoid a veto, the Council resolution adopted subsequent
to the bombing did not retroactively legalize NATO's actions but only
prospectively authorized foreign states to intervene in the FRY to
7
maintain the peace.
Neither of the permissible uses of force in international relations
under the U.N. Charter-enforcement actions by the Security
Council under Chapter VII and self-defense-provides a legal
justification for the NATO action.8 The International Court of

2.
See generally S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/ 1199 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3937th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).
3.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1160, supranote 2, para. 7 (expressing support for
OSCE's efforts towards peaceful resolution of conflict).
4.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1199, supranote 2, preamble.
5.
See generally S.C. Res. 1160, supranote 2; S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 2.
6.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 2, preamble ("Reaffirming also the

commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia").
7.
See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/ 1244 (1999), para. 7.
8.
See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 2.4, 42, 51; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949
I.C.J. 4, at 32-35 & dispositif (April 9); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 93, 94, 98-100 (June 27); Oscar Schachter, The Right of
States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1624-26, 1629-33 (1984); see also
Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess, Supp. No. 31, at 142,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (1974); Declaration on Principles of International Law
ConcerningFriendly Relations and Co-OperationAmong States in Accordancewith the
Charterof the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 28,
at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1971).
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Justice (ICJ) acknowledged this problem (without purporting to
decide the merits) in its decision refusing to grant the FRY's request
for interim measures of protection. 9
Various scholars and diplomats have searched for exceptions to
the U.N. Charter prohibition on the use of force, principally through
liberal interpretations of the phrases "territorial integrity" and
"inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter" contained in Article

2(4).10

Those arguments are unfounded.

The use of force by

bombing the territory of another state violates its territorial integrity
regardless of the motivation. 1 Furthermore, the first purpose of the

Charter is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war" 12 by "maintain[ing] international peace and security."' 3 The
protection of human rights is also among the primary purposes of
the Charter, although subsidiary to the objective of limiting war and
the use of force in international relations, as found in the express
Charter prohibitioxis on the use of force. 14 This interpretation is
supported by the travaux pr~paratoires of the Charter. They
establish that the phrases "territorial integrity" and "inconsistent
with the purposes of the Charter" were added to Article 2(4) to close
all potential loopholes in its prohibition on the use of force, rather
than to open new ones. 1 5 Neither the use of force by regional
organizations against nonconsenting states nor intervention to

9.
Although the Court denied the request for indication of interim measures,
it indicated that it was 'profoundly concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia" and
that "under the present circumstances such use raises very serious issues of
international law." Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.) Order, para. 17 (June 2,
1999) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe/htm>.
See Bruno
Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force:Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-6
(1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 905 cmt. g (1987).
10.
Article 2(4) states, "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other mainer inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). For examples of the search for
exceptions to the Prohibition, see Oscar Schachter, InternationalLaw in Theory and
Practice, GeneralCourse in PublicInternationalLaw, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 138-49
(1982); Daniel Wolf, HumanitarianIntervention, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 333,

339-40 (1988). But see id. at 368.
11.
See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 32-33; Definition of Aggression, supra
note 8, arts. 1, 3, 5; Schachter, supranote 10, at 140-4 1.
12.
U.N. CHARTER preamble, para. 1.
13.
Id. art. 1.1.
14.
See id. preamble, para. 2, arts. 1.2-1.3; see also Declarationon Principles
of InternationalLaw Concerning FriendlyRelations and Co-OperationAmong States in
Accordance with the Charterof the United Nations, supranote 8, preamble; Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protectionof Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th
Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, UN. Doc. A/6220 (1965).
15.
See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 26568 (1991).
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support domestic insurrections is permitted absent authorization by
the Security Council or resort to self-defense. 1 6 Any other uses of
force that may have been legal under pre-Charter law ended when
the Charter entered into force.

III. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Despite the limitations in the text of the U.N. Charter,
humanitarian intervention arguably provides a lawful foundation for
the NATO actions. Unfortunately, humanitarian intervention is not
an exception to the Charter prohibitions on the use of force. 17 No
reference to such a right is found in the Charter. The doctrine of
"humanitarian intervention" is not well defined, and the evidence
does not establish a rule of law permitting the use of force against
a state in situations like that of Kosovo.
Most situations in which this theory is arguably applied actually
involve actions by states to protect their citizens abroad from alleged
mortal danger. Such intervention probably falls under the doctrine
of self-defense.' 8 Examples include actions in the Congo, the
Dominican Republic, Entebbe, Grenada, and Panama.' 9 With the

16.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100-03, 109, 110,
124, 126 (June 27). This decision was taken despite prior U.N. General Assembly
resolutions that arguably allowed intervention to support self determination. See,
e.g., Definition of Aggression, supra note 8, at 144, art. 7; Declarationon Principlesof
InternationalLaws ConcerningFriendly Relations and Co-OperationAmong States in
Accordancewith the Charterof the United Nations, supranote 8, at 121; Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protectionof Their Independence and Sovereignty, supranote 14, at 11. The KLA is
an example of a revolutionary group that is difficult to support on humanitarian and
self determination grounds due to its fascist and Stalinist affinities. See Chris
Hedges, Kosovo's Next Masters?, 78 FOREIGN. AFF. 24, 26-28 (May-June 1999).
17.
See generally Declarationon Principles of InternationalLaw Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-OperationAmong States in Accordance with the Charterof the
United Nations, supra note 8, at 121; Definition of Aggression, supra note 8, at 143,
art. 5; Declarationon the Inadmissibility of Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protectionof theirIndependence and Sovereignty, supranote 14, at 11.
See also Schachter, supra note 8, at 1628-33; Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian
Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217, 218-19 (John Norton
Moore ed., 1974). But see Wolf, supra note 10, at 344-54; Richard B. Lillich,
Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive
Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra, at 229; Michael
Reisman, HumanitarianIntervention to Protectthe Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS app. A (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
18.
See Schachter, supranote 10, at 143-49.
19.
The 1976 Israeli raid on Entebbe was justified on the ground of selfdefense and protection of Israeli nationals. See U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/PV.1939, at 51-59 (July 9, 1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1228, 1228-31 (1976). See
also the two failed UNSC resolutions submitted in regard to the incident, U.N. Doc.
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apparent sole exception of the Entebbe raid, however, many
consider that the justifications given for those interventions were
actually ruses to conceal that they were conducted for other political
objectives. 20 This risk of abuse points to the need to adhere closely
to the core Charter prohibitions on the use of force, even though it
may be lawful to intervene to protect a state's own nationals. Other
situations invoked as solidly supporting the theory of humanitarian
intervention also fall short.2 1

For example, India intervened in East

S/12138 (July 12, 1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1226 (1976); U.N. Doc. S/ 12139 (July
12, 1976), reprintedin 15 I.L.M. at 1226-27 (1976). The RESTATEMENT reports:
It is generally accepted that Article 2(4) does not forbid limited use of force in
the territory of another state incidental to attempts to rescue persons whose
lives are endangered there, as in the rescue at Entebbe in 1976. That
interpretation of the Charter, however, would not justify the use of force by
one state on its own authority to conquer another state or overthrow its
government even if that government had been guilty of persecution of
minorities or other gross v.iolations of human rights.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 905
cmt. G (1987). See also Roderick D. Margo, The Legality of the Entebbe Raid In
International Law, 94 S. AFR. L.J. 306, 309-10 (1977); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 227-30 (2d ed. 1994); Louis Henkin, Use of Force:Law
and U.S. Policy, in Louis HENKIN ETAL., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 37, 41-42 (2d. ed. 1991) (limited exception to the prohibition on the use of
force in order to save hostages only such as Entebbe). Allegedly the United States
intervened in Grenada to save nationals, and the action was legitimized by invitation
of the government and authorization of a regional organization. In reality, it was a
unilateral move to prevent Grenada from falling under Communist rule. See The
Situation in Granada, G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. 47, at 19, U.N.
Doc. A/38/L.8 and add. 1, A/38/L.9 (Nov. 2, 1983) (condemning the U.S. action). In
1965, the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic, with the support of
the OAS, to protect the lives of U.S. and other foreign nationals and to stop a
communist revolution. See 52 DEP'r ST. BULL. 744, 745-46 (1965) (statement by
President Johnson of May 2, 1965, justifying United States unilateral intervention);
Resolution Establishing Inter-American Force, May 6, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 594 (1965) (after
United States intervention); Leonard C. Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the
Perspectiveof InternationalLaw, 53 DEPT ST. BULL. 60 (1965); Wolfgang Friedmann,
United States Policy and the CrisisofIntemationalLaw, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 857, 866-68
(1965); A. J. THOMAS JR. & ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS

1965 (John Carey ed., 1967). In 1964, the United States and Belgium intervened in

the Congo to save foreign nationals at a time that civil order in the country had
broken down. See S.C. Res. 199, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1189th mtg. at 328-29,
U.N.Doc. S/6129 (1964) ("Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo" and requesting "all states to refrain or desist from
intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo," but not indicating any support for
that intervention). In 1989, the United States intervened in Panama to save the lives
of Americans, but also to protect U.S. interests in the Panama Canal, replace the
ruling powers pursuant to an election, and bring the President of Panama to the
United States for prosecution. See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practiceof the
United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 536, 545-49 (1990).
20.
See supranote 19.
21.
See Schachter, supranote 10, at 146-48; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw
442-43 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
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Pakistan allegedly to protect the ethnic Bengalis during the 1971
civil war in Pakistan. A large majority in the U.N. General Assembly
condemned this action, and India clearly had objectives other than
merely humanitarian ones. 2 2 The resolution adopted by the General
Assembly in response to this incident makes clear that the
international community opposed the doctrine.
Intervention
executed apparently for humanitarian reasons has often been
justified as a matter of law on the basis of an alleged request to
intervene by the government of the state concerned, for example, in
23
Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Hungary.
Not only were the requests of dubious legitimacy, but the
humanitarian grounds put forward were designed to mask other

political objectives. Some situations have involved the collapse of a
state's effective government, and intervention was allegedly
undertaken to restore order, as in Cambodia, the Congo, Liberia,

22.
See G.A. Res. 2793, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/L.647/Rev. 1 (1971) (calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops to their own
state's territory); Schachter, supranote 10, at 144.
23.
See supra note 19 (discussing U.S. intervention in Grenada and the
Dominican Republic). The USSRjustified its 1968 intervention into Hungary on the
grounds that the government requested that it protect the population from a
revolution by reactionary groups. See G.A. Res. 1004, U.N. GAOR, 2d Emergency
Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 5, (1956) (calling on the USSR to withdraw its forces from
Hungary); G.A. Res. 1131, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 64, U.N. Doc.
A/3572 (1956) (calling for the USSR to withdraw its forces from Hungary); Statement
of the USSR, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., 582nd plen. mtg., at 108, 111-12 (Nov. 19,
1956) (fascist actions threatening the Hungarian population, collective self-defense
and government request); United Nations, The Report on Hungary, 2 U.N. REV. 4 (No.
2, Aug. 1957). The USSR intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 allegedly pursuant
to a request of the government and collective self-defense under mutual treaty
obligations. Letter Dated 21 August 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/8759 (1968), reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1288 (1968) (justifying the
intervention); U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1441, at 41-52 (Mr. Malik, USSR, justifying the USSR
intervention); id. at 66-77 (Mr. Muzik, Czechoslovakia, denying that the USSR was
requested to intervene and denying that international law justified the USSR
intervention) (Aug. 21, 1968); Tass Statement on Military Intervention, 7 I.L.M. 1283
(1968) (justifying the intervention); Declaration of the Presidium of the Central
Committee of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, 7 I.L.M. 1285 (1968) (denying that
the USSR intervention was requested or justified), Proclamationof the Presidiumofthe
Czechoslovakian National Assembly, 7 I.L.M. 1286 (1968) (protesting the USSR
intervention).
See a draft resolution affirming the "sovereignty, political
independence and territorial integrity" of Czechoslovakia that failed despite a 10-2
vote with three abstentions due to the USSR veto (accompanied by Hungary), U.N.
Doc. S/PV.1443, at 163-65 (Aug. 22, 1968)). See also various post-intervention
statements and reports at 7 I.L.M. 1300-39 (1968); Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses
of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations,in LAW AND FORCE INTHE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 65, 88 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.,
1991).
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and Uganda. Again, other political interests have often animated
24
the intervening states.
Finally, few, if any, interventions can be found in which the
intervening states have expressly based their actions on the right of
humanitarian intervention. In the absence of such a linkage by the
intervening states, the actions can hardly serve as opinio juris in
support of such a right.

IV. NEW LAW

Perhaps the Kosovo intervention sets a precedent for the
development of new international law to protect human rights. After
all, general international law may change through breach of the
current law and the development of new state practice and opinio
juris supporting the change. The Kosovo intervention, however,
presents problems in this regard. In the Nicaragua case, the
International Court of Justice found that, to challenge a rule of
international law, the state practice relied upon must be clearly
predicated on that different rule of law;25 however, NATO has not

justified its actions on the basis of a specific rule of law-even
humanitarian intervention-new or old. Throughout the campaign,

24.
See, e.g., supranote 19 (discussing the 1964 United States and Belgian
intervention in the Congo). Tanzania intervened in Uganda in 1979 to support a
Ugandan insurrection against President Idi Amin. Vietnam's 1978 intervention in
Cambodia was closely related to a long term conflict between the countries but was
allegedly based on the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge. See G.A. Res. 34/22, U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., 67th plen. mtg. (Nov. 14, 1979) (calling for all foreign forces to
cease all hostilities, withdraw from Cambodia and to refrain from interference in its
internal affairs). See also Schachter, supra note 23, at 88 (discussing a similar
situation in Liberia).
25.
The Court wrote:
The significance for the Court of cases of State conduct prima facie
inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention lies in the nature of the
ground offered as justification. Reliance by a State on a novel right or an
unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by
other States, tend towards a modification of customary international law. In
fact however the Court finds that States have not justified their conduct by
reference to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle of
its prohibition. The United States authorities have on some occasions clearly
stated their grounds for intervening in the affairs of a foreign State for
reasons connected with, for example, the domestic policies of that country,
its ideology, the level of its armaments, or the direction of its foreign policy.
But these were statements of international policy, and not an assertion of

rules of existing international law.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 109.
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NATO offered no legal justification for its action. 2 6 Only in the
recent suits against the intervening NATO states before the ICJ did
27
the respondents begin to articulate legal justifications.
Nevertheless, only Belgium even mentioned humanitarian
8

2
intervention, and then merely as a possible legal justification.
Another obstacle to changing the existing international law is
that the rule prohibiting the use of force is derived from the U.N.
Charter. Charter law may very well not be subject to change by new
general international law. By its terms, the U.N. Charter overrides
all inconsistent treaties, regardless of the date of their entry into
force. 2 9 One would expect the same rule to apply to developments
in general international law, especially since treaties supersede all

26.
See Press Statement by Dr. JavierSolana, Secretary Generalof NATO (NATO
Press Release No. (1999)040, Mar. 23, 1999) <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/
p99-040E.htm> ("Our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more
repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo. We must also act
to prevent instability spreading in the region").
27.
See infra note 28.
28.
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), Translation of Oral Pleadings of
Belgium (May 10, 1999) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm>
("This is a case of a lawful armed humanitarian intervention for which there is a
compelling necessity"). Portugal presented a somewhat less direct legal justification that
is mirrored in the arguments of others: "NATO's operation was an exceptional

intervention with the aim to put an end and minimize a gross violation of human rightscaused by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Port.),
Oral Pleadings of Portugal. Para. 3.1.4 (May 11, 1999) <http://wwv.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iypo/iypoframe.htm>. Germany made similar arguments. See
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. F.R.G.), Oral Pleadings of Germany, para. 1.3.1 (May 11,
1999) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwvw/ idocket/iyge/iygeframe.htm>. Other respondents
made reference to the violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Kosovo by the
FRY, the need to avoid a catastrophe and the discretion the ICJ may exercise in granting
or denying the request for interim measures, but they did not expressly link their
arguments to a rule of international law that would justify the NATO intervention. See
generallyOral Pleadings of Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom,
and United States <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyus/ iyusframe.htm>. Of
course, these were proceedings on the FRY's request for interim measures of protection
and the merits of the dispute were not under direct consideration. All the respondents
relied most heavily on the argument that ICJ jurisdiction was lacking. Thus, Professor
Brownlie argued for the FRY in rebuttal:
The respondent States in the course of the ten hours placed at their disposal
made no effort to offer a developed legal justification for the air offensive. It
is true that, quite exceptionally, the representative of Belgium contended that
it was an armed humanitarian intervention which was compatible with Article
2, paragraph 4, and he admitted that the alleged principle was emerging
slowly.
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg. et al.), Oral Rebuttal of Yugoslavia (May 12,
1999) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iypo/iypoframe.htm>.
Other respondents made no reference to humanitarian intervention but used the unusual
phrase "humanitarian catastrophe." See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v.
F.R.G.), Oral Pleadings of Germany (May 11, 1999), para 3.1.4.
29.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
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but jus cogens norms.
Furthermore, because the Charter
restrictions on the use of force are themselves jus cogens norms, it
would take a new norm of that quality to override them. The only
clearly effective solution would be to amend the U.N. Charter on the
30
basis of a norm of equal status.
One might argue, of course, that the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention is merely a new and improved interpretation of the
human rights provisions already in the Charter. This view might be
supported by reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which gives an agreement of treaty parties persuasive value
in regard to its interpretation. 3 But no such agreement of U.N.

members can be shown.
Alternatively, one might argue that the international legal
system has radically changed since the founding of the United
Nations, resulting in the development of a right of humanitarian
intervention.
At the time the Charter entered into force,
international law centered on state sovereignty. The independence
of states, especially with respect to matters of domestic concern, was
of foremost importance. 32 New developments in international
human rights law, particularly with regard to international crimes,
authorize, if not require, all states to take action in the face of
widespread grave violations of human rights amounting to such
crimes. 33 Thus, one might argue that contemporary public

30.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 108-09 (providing amendment procedure).
31.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 340 § 3.
32.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7); Declarationon the Inadmissibilityof Intervention
into the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and
Sovereignty, supranote 14, at 11.
33.
See Report of the Secretary General Pursuantto Paragraph2 of Security
CouncilResolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted
in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) (discussing the prospect of "Establishing an International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., at 3,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) reprintedin 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1602 (1994) (establishing
an international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed
in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other
such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states between January 1,
1994 and December 31, 1994); Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.1S3/9* (1998), reprinted in37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. As
of November 2, 1999, there were four ratifications of the Statute of the sixty
necessary to bring it into force. Eighty-nine states had signed the Statute. See also
S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992) (UNSC authorization of intervention in Somalia); S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994) (UNSC authorization of
intervention in Haiti); S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392nd mtg. at 2, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/929 (1994) (UNSC authorization of intervention in Rwanda). One might
also perhaps include the actions by the United States, the United Kingdom, and
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international law and a proper contemporary interpretation of the
U.N. Charter permit pure humanitarian intervention without
Chapter VII authorization by the Security Council or a situation of
self-defense.
But has the law changed so radically? Does the international
community wish to authorize individual states or groups of states,
by themselves, to use force against a nonconsenting state in such
situations? It is hard to find an international consensus to support
this proposition, even among the NATO states. Certainly, neither
widespread state practice nor opiniojuris exist to support this view.
Past resolutions by the General Assembly that condemn specific
interventions and other resolutions and declarations addressing
broad subjects like intervention, the use of force, self-determination,
and human rights foreclose such actions, demonstrating
international opposition to such a rule.3 4 Furthermore, the statutes
of none of the existing or proposed international criminal tribunalsthe Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the international
criminal court-authorize such interventions. 3 5 Accordingly, a
doctrine of humanitarian intervention that would legitimate NATO's
Kosovo actions cannot be found.
One might further ask whether, as a policy matter, international
law should make humanitarian intervention legal. One could argue
that this step is morally and ethically required. Public international
law, as all law, should conform to the highest ideals. Humanitarian

intervention would also protect human rights already encompassed
by international law and the law of the Charter. This aspect is
particularly important since the situations concerned may pose
risks to international peace and security that might be stopped only
by forcible intervention.
On the other hand, humanitarian intervention presents grave
risks of abuse, as illustrated by virtually all of the past actions put
forward in its support.3 6 Once established, such a right would be

France in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi government. See Jules
Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council:Ambiguous Authorizations to
Use Force, Cease-Firesand the IraqiInspectionRegime, 93 AM. J. INTL LAW 124, 13233 (1999).
34.
See G.A. Res. 2793, supranote 22, at 3 (India intervention in Pakistan,
calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops to their own state's territory); S.C.
Res. 199, supranote 19 (1964 United States and Belgian intervention in the Congo);
G.A. Res. 38/7, supranote 19 (U.S. intervention in Grenada); G.A. Res. 34/22, supra
note 24, at 19 (Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia); Declaration on Principles of
InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-OperationAmong States in
Accordance with the Charterof the United Nations, supra note 8, at 121; Definition of
Aggression, supra note 8, at 142; Declarationon the Inadmissibility of Intervention into
the DomesticAffairs of States and the Protection of theirIndependence and Sovereignty,
supranote 14, at 11.
35.
See supranote 33.
36.
See supra note 19.
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difficult to check, thwarting containment of those unacceptable
risks. It is clear, therefore, that humanitarian intervention raises
serious difficulties despite its noble objectives. That was the
judgment of states participating in the San Francisco Conference
when they negotiated the U.N. Charter after World War II, and it
remains unchanged.
V.

DEVELOPING THE LAW

Despite these limitations and risks, support for a doctrine of
humanitarian intervention may be growing. Whether many states
would endorse such a rule remains to be seen. Weak states may
fear such interventions. The strongest states may wish to retain the
option of using their veto in the Security Council, as well as their
power to take actions for political reasons notwithstanding the law.
Thus, keeping such intervention illegal and requiring states to break
the law in extreme circumstances may be the best and most likely
way to limit abuse, although it remains an imperfect solution.
If the international community does wish to establish new law
permitting humanitarian intervention, it should apply only to
situations of widespread and gross violations of human rights and
the necessary remedial actions. Sufficient support for such new law
was lacking in the past. Arguably, the Kosovo events and other
similar developments have changed the situation.
Let us consider how one might develop international law to
attain the objectives that humanitarian intervention is supposed to
serve, while also avoiding risks of abuse and excessive damage. The
existing law of the U.N. Charter gives the Security Council the right
to authorize such interventions.3 7 Such authority, however,
requires an affirmative vote by a three-fifths majority of the fifteen
Council members and no veto by any of the five permanent
members.3 8 With the exception of the early years of the United
Nations and the early 1990s, this procedure has not proved
efficacious. One could imagine other procedures that the United
Nations or other global organizations could adopt that might provide
a legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention. 9 In my opinion,
37.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42.
38.
See id. art. 27(3).
39.
E.g., a UNSC vote by a three-fifths majority but without the right to a veto
by the permanent members; a restructured UNSC with more states added with or
without veto rights; a UNGA vote by a two-thirds majority (the Uniting for Peace
Resolution); a rapid ICJ advisory opinion requested by the UNGA or a special organ
of the UNGA or UNSC that would find that the specific situation makes a
humanitarian intervention lawful; an International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment
and order of enforcement to arrest violators and to stop the violations that would be
carried out under the authority of the ICC prosecutor with the assistance of
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however, the development of such mechanisms will not be politically
feasible in the foreseeable future. Nor is it likely that any such
changes would adequately balance the need to restrict the use of
force with the ability to engage in humanitarian intervention in
justifiable circumstances.
If humanitarian intervention outside the traditional interpretation of the U.N. Charter is to be sought, it should be based on
principles that build upon arguments in its favor. 40 That new law
should be clear and should limit the potential for abuse. The
necessary international consensus might be established either by
superseding general international law at the level of a jus cogens
norm or by reinterpreting the U.N. Charter on the basis of agreement of the U.N. member states. One should not underestimate the
difficulty of accomplishing this objective. Nevertheless, several
approaches might balance the interests well. Perhaps the following

procedural and factual requirements could form the basis for an
appropriately balanced regime.
Proof. Publicly available evidence must establish that
widespread and grave international crimes as defined in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court4 ' are being committed
in a state and that this state supports these criminal activities,
acquiesces in them, or cannot control them.
Notice. A regional intergovernmental organization in the same
area as the state in which the crimes are being committed must call
upon that state to take action itself or with the help of others to stop
those crimes.
Exhaustion of remedies. The regional group must exhaust all
reasonably available means to stop the criminal behavior, including
negotiations, political initiatives, nonforcible countermeasures (such
as economic sanctions), among others.
U.N. role. If those countermeasures fail to produce the
necessary results, the regional organization, acting through its U.N.
member states, must formally bring the matter to the attention of
the General Assembly and the Security Council on an emergency

cooperating states; a standing international force under a new international
authority.
40.
Others have made similar proposals. See generally, e.g., Simma, supra
note 9; Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimizationof ForcibleHumanitarianCountermeasuresin the World Community?, 10

EUR. J. INT'L L. 21 (1999); see also Ved P. Nanda, The United States'Action in the 1965
Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order-Part1, 43 DENV. L.J. 439, 473-74 (1966];
Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States To ProtectHuman Rights, 53 IOwA L.
REV. 325, 347-51 (1967).

41.

See ICC Statute, supra note 33. The crimes within the jurisdiction of the

Court include: genocide (arts. 5.1(a) & 6), crimes against humanity (arts. 5.1(b) & 7),
war crimes (arts. 5.1(c) & 8), and, once an agreement is reached in the future,
aggression (arts. 5. 1(d) & 5.2).
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basis. It should seek Chapter VII authorization from the Security
Council to take appropriate action to stop the crimes. If the Council
authorizes such action, the matter must remain under its control.
If, however, the Council fails to approve such action, and neither it
nor the General Assembly adopts a resolution expressly forbidding
further action by the regional organization, recourse to a U.N.-based
remedy will be deemed exhausted.
Regional action. The regional organization could then lawfully
take forcible action to stop the continuing, widespread grave
violations of international criminal law in the target state subject to
the following limitations:
Warning. The target state must be notified in advance of the
impending use of force.
Courtjurisdiction. Before intervening, the states that are to
participate must consent both to suit in the ICJ by any

directly injured state for violations of international law
committed in the course of the humanitarian intervention,
and to the jurisdiction of the international criminal court
(once established)4 2 over their nationals for crimes within that
court's reach that might be committed in the course of the
intervention.
Purpose and means. Force must be used only to stop the
widespread and massive violations of international criminal
law. To this end, the targets must be limited, collateral
damage minimized, unrelated effects on the state's legitimate
functions avoided, and other requirements of international
humanitarian law strictly observed.
Withdrawal. Once the use of force has accomplished the
appropriate objectives and the future is secured, the foreign
forces must withdraw, absent the target state's consent to
their remaining or the adoption of Security Council
authorization under Chapter VII.
The purpose of these requirements is to limit the use of
humanitarian intervention to the gravest of cases in which no
alternative is available and to limit the effects on the target state and
the risks of abuse. Such actions could be taken only by a regional
organization, which necessitates multiple-state support as opposed
to unilateral action. The stated goals would be accomplished by
requiring specific conditions and giving the target state and the
United Nations opportunities to prevent intervention. The inclusion
of a judicial role may further remove such actions from international
politics by strengthening the salience of international law.
This approach might appropriately balance the desire to protect
human rights with the need to minimize the use of force in

42.

Assuming that the ICC Statute, supranote 33, enters into force.
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relations. If recent developments in international
reflect a watershed change in attitude by the
community, a rule of law permitting some form of
intervention, such as the above proposal, might be

feasible. The most appropriate, but also the most difficult, way to
accomplish this objective would be to amend the U.N. Charter.
Other solutions are troublesome for the reasons discussed above.
One might credibly argue, however, that this plan would conform to
the Charter by (1) clearly promoting human rights, (2) minimizing
the potential and degree of intervention (some argue that it is not
intervention), including prejudice to the territorial integrity of the
target state, (3) implicitly earning U.N. authorization, and (4)
building on ambiguities some find in the Charter with regard to the
authority of regional organizations.

VI. Kosovo
Unfortunately, it is difficult to justify the NATO intervention in
Kosovo even on these suggested grounds, if one focuses on the
situation at the time the intervention began, as should be the
case. 43 A review of some of the above requirements proves this
conclusion.
Proof. The extent of the human rights violations in Kosovo prior
to the withdrawal of the OSCE's observer force was not massive and
widespread. 4 4 In fact, the Security Council had authorized the
deployment of the verification mission, which had effectively
prevented the commission of widespread atrocities. 4 s The FRY's
behavior changed only after NATO forced the withdrawal of the

43.

See generally Simma, supra note 9; Cassese, supranote 40 (reaching the

same ultimate conclusion).
44.

Even the U.S. Department of State's press releases recognize that while

the risks were present, during the time that the KVM was in place the FRY violence
was limited and focused on the suppression of the insurrectionist KLA. See US
Department of State, Kosovo Update (March 2, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/
regions/eur/rpt990302 kdom.html>; US Department of State, Kosovo Update,
March 12, 1999 <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_790312_kdom.html>;
US Department of State, Kosovo Humanitarian Situation Report, March 31, 1999.
In the March 31 report, the section entitled "Background" identifies minimal FRY
violence against ethnic Albanians and those actions are related to the conflict with
the KLA. But the document goes on to report a massive upsurge of widespread
abuses of the ethnic Albanian's human rights after the withdrawal of the KVM and
the commencement of NATO bombing. See also US Department of State, Erasing
History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo (May 1999) <http://wwv.state.gov/wwv/
regions/eur/rpt9905_ethnicksvo_ toc.html>. All of these U.S. State Department
documents may be found at the following web site: (visited May 19, 1999)
<http:www.state.gov/ wv/regions/eur/kosovohp.html>.
45.
See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
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OSCE observers. These facts are apparent in the indictment of
President Milofevid on May 22, 1999 by the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 4 6 Other
than general accusations, the specific charges document only one
situation involving a significant number of deaths caused by FRY
forces in the months prior to the start of the NATO bombing
campaign on March 24, 1999. That incident, during which forty-five
persons were killed, took place in Racak more than two months

before the NATO action on January 15, 1999. 4 7 There were also

48
reports of displacements of Albanian Kosovars within the FRY.
This is not a circumstance involving ongoing widespread grave
violations of international criminal law. All the remaining counts
49
concern events that occurred after the bombing commenced.
50
Those events do involve substantially larger numbers of persons,
but they cannot serve as a legal justification for the earlier beginning
of the NATO campaign.
Exhaustion of remedies. It is difficult to find exhaustion of
nonforcible remedies. Some questionable efforts were made to
negotiate with the FRY, but only after the bombing started was an
oil embargo considered.
U.N. role. Although neither the Security Council nor the
General Assembly forbade the intervention, the Council did retain
jurisdiction over the matter and was involved in efforts to prevent
human rights abuses (particularly through the use of the verification
mission), albeit without complete success. One might argue that the
rejection of the Security Council resolution introduced by Russia
and the failure of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to condemn the
NATO actions in an informal statement, both of which took place
shortly after the NATO campaign began, proved the acquiescence of
the United Nations in the intervention.5 1 On the other hand, prior

See Intemational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictment
46.
of the Prosecutorof the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic et al. (May 24, 1999)

<http//www.un.org/icty/indictment/engish/24-05-99mflo.htm> [hereinafter Indictment].
47.
See id. paras. 28, 98(a), sched. A.
48.
See generally id.
See id. paras. 97-100.
49.
50.
See id. paras. 37-39, 97(a)-(j) (deportation of approximately 740,000
Kosovo Albanian civilians between April 2, 1999 and May 22, 1999); id. para. 98(b)-(e)
& sched. B-G (killings between March 25, 1999 and May 22, 1999: Bela Crkva
(Orahovac/Rahovec municipality) killing 67 persons; Velika Krusa and Mali
Krusa/Krushe e Mahde and Krushe e Vogel (Orahovac/Rahovec municipality) killing
105 persons; Dakovica/Gjakov6 killing 6 persons; Crkolez/Padalishte (Istok/Istog
municipality) killing 20 persons; Izbica (Srbica/Skenderaj municipality) killing 130
persons; Qerim district of Dakovica/GjakovE killing 20 persons. The same is true of
subsequently discovered crimes to date.
See UN PressRelease, Security CouncilRejects Demand for Cessationof Use
51.
of ForceAgainst FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 3989th Mtg., U.N. Doc.
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Security Council resolutions on Kosovo support the view that the
Council was addressing the problem, though not to everyone's
satisfaction.
Purpose and means. The NATO action did not stop the
commission of widespread grave violations of international criminal
law (even if one assumes that they were taking place just prior to the
bombing). The intervention clearly did not protect the ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo. Instead, by removing the OSCE observers,
NATO allowed the FRY to commence a campaign of widespread grave

violations of international criminal law. We will never know if those
violations would have taken place in the absence of the removal of
the observer mission and the initiation of the NATO campaign. The
military campaign itself was not tailored to protect the ethnic

Albanians in Kosovo;5 2 rather, it had the broader objective of
undermining the FRY Government to force its capitulation, together
with the collateral objective of freeing some or all of Kosovo from FRY
control by partition or independence. As of today, the success one
can speak of is the cessation of the massive Serbian violations
commenced after the bombing began and the de facto partition of
the FRY.
Courtjurisdiction. Finally, consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ
and the international criminal court was not given by all the
participating states, but since this part of the proposal is
particularly novel and the latter court has not yet been established,
such consent could not have been expected.

VII. CONCLUSION

The international community has moved toward the creation of
stronger international human rights law, including greater
It has not, however,
enforcement and protection measures.
authorized some states to intervene by the use of force in third
states to protect those rights, absent Chapter VII authorization by
the Security Council or a situation of self-defense-moral and
ethical arguments in favor of humanitarian intervention
notwithstanding. Because the Council neither authorized NATO's
actions before they commenced nor approved them subsequently in
its resolution of June 10, 1999, their legality remains questionable

at best. In fact, the Kosovo intervention reflects the problems of an
undeveloped rule of law in a morally dangerous situation. It was

sC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999) <http://www.un.org/News/Press>; Judith Miller, The
Secretary General Offers Implicit Endorsement of Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at
A13.
52.
Edward N. Luttwak, Give War a Chance, FOREIGN AFF. 36, 41 (July-Aug.
1999).
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actually an "anticipatory humanitarian intervention" based on past
actions of the FRY regime and future risks of conflict. Such
intervention, like "anticipatory self-defense," is a particularly
53
dangerous permutation of an already problematic concept.
Although many will share the view that the intervention was morally
just in light of subsequent developments, it presents an unfortunate
precedent. If this action stands for the right of foreign states to
intervene in the absence of proof that widespread grave violations of
international human rights are being committed, it leaves the door
open for hegemonic states to use force for purposes clearly
incompatible with international law.

Perhaps the example of Kosovo may stimulate the development
of a new rule of law that permits intervention by regional
organizations to stop these crimes without the Security Council's
authorization, while limiting the risks of abuse and escalation. That
is the task for the future.

53.

The international community debated for years whether a right of self-

defense includes actions prior to an attack.

Most consider such actions as

impermissible. "Anticipatory humanitarian intervention," while laudable, seems even
less justifiable. Similarly, there has been some suggestion that the intervention was
taken to avoid destabilizing the region and, thus, leading to an international conflict.
This pushes the right of self defense beyond even anticipatory self defense and is
hardly legally justifiable.

